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This paper uses the 2000 Census 1-in-6 sample to look at the long-term impact of Vietnam-era military
service.  Instrumental Variables estimates using draft-lottery instruments show post-service earnings
losses close to zero in 2000, in contrast with earlier results showing substantial earnings losses for
white veterans in the 1970s and 1980s. The estimates also point to a marked increase in schooling
that appears to be attributable to the Vietnam-era GI Bill.  The net wage effects observed in the 2000
data can be explained by a flattening of the experience profile in middle age and a modest return to
the increased schooling generated by the GI Bill.  Evidence on disability effects is mixed but seems














Economists had a pivotal role in formulating the intellectual case against the draft. The
core of this argument is that conscription amounts to a hidden tax on soldiers, with
the further disadvantage of uncertainty as to who will have to pay (see, e.g., Oi, 1967).
This negative view of the draft notwithstanding, WWII veterans typically have somewhat
better civilian outcomes than same-age non-veterans, while Vietnam era veterans do only a
little worse.1 A fundamental diﬃculty with these simple comparisons, however, is selection
bias. The process of screening for military service generates a pool of veterans that
diﬀers in important ways from non-veterans. For example, in a comparison of the civilian
mortality risk of WWII veterans with others from the same cohorts, WWII veterans had
lower death rates, primarily due to a reduced risk of deaths from disease (Seltzer and
Jablon, 1974). Although military service may impart some beneﬁts, increased longevity
seems likely to be an artifact of health-related selection bias.
Although not as obvious as the selection bias inherent in mortality comparisons, se-
lection bias is also a concern in studies of the economic eﬀects of the draft. The military
enlistment process selects soldiers on the basis of factors related to earnings potential in
at least two ways. On one hand, the military prefers high school graduates, and screens
out those with very low test scores. As a result, men with very low earnings potential are
unlikely to end up as soldiers.2 On the other hand, some potential recruits ﬁnd military
service attractive precisely because their prospects in the civilian labor market are poor,
while those with the highest earnings potential probably ﬁnd it worthwhile to work hard
to escape the draft. The net selection bias in this case is unclear.
The draft lottery provides an opportunity to overcome the problem of selection bias in
estimates of the consequences of Vietnam-era military service. From 1970-72, induction
priority was determined by a series of lotteries in which cohorts at risk of conscription
were assigned random sequence numbers (RSNs) from 1-365. Men were then called for
pre-induction processing from lowest-to-highest, up to a ceiling. Because draft lottery
numbers are highly correlated with veteran status, and probably uncorrelated with other
factors related to earnings, lottery RSNs can be used to construct instrumental variables
(IV) estimates of the causal eﬀect of Vietnam-era conscription on variables like civilian
1See, for example, studies of veteran eﬀects cited in Angrist and Krueger (1994). Henderson (2005)
reviews the role of economists in ending the draft.
2See, e.g., Eitelberg et al. (1984).earnings, educational attainment, and health.
Angrist (1990) used the draft lottery to construct IV estimates of the eﬀect of compul-
sory military service on civilian earnings through 1984. These estimates show substantial
earnings losses for white veterans - as much as 15 percent of average civilian earnings in the
cohort.3 Angrist (1990) argued that the time series pattern of estimated earnings losses
is explained by lost labor market experience. In particular, estimates of a log-quadratic
potential-experience model suggest military service generates earnings losses equivalent
to roughly two years of lost experience, the period of service for draftees. An implication
of the loss-of-experience story is that Vietnam-era draftees should eventually catch up
with same-age non-veterans, though they had not done so by 1984, when the draft-lottery
cohorts were in their early-to-mid thirties.
The empirical analysis in this paper begins with new estimates of the long-term eﬀects
of Vietnam-era service. The 2000 Census long form, which collects information on exact
dates of birth, provides an opportunity to look at the economic and other consequences
of Vietnam-era conscription as the draft-lottery cohorts approach age 50.4 In addition
to earnings and other labor market variables, we look at schooling and disability status.
Schooling is especially interesting in this context because of the GI Bill, widely believed
to be a driving force in the expansion of American higher education. Vietnam veterans
had access to GI Bill beneﬁts similar to those made available to veterans of WWII and
Korea. Disability status is important because Vietnam-era service may be linked to a
number of health problems, most notably Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and
conditions that have been related to the Agent Orange herbicide.
In addition to directly estimating the long-term impact of Vietnam-era conscription,
we oﬀer an interpretation of schooling and earnings eﬀects using a Mincer-style wage
equation. Our interpretation is motivated by two ﬁndings. First, the earnings results (and
the eﬀects on other labor market variables such as employment) are nearly zero, consistent
with the overtaking age of about 50 estimated for veterans in Angrist (1990). Second, the
2000 Census data show a marked impact of Vietnam-era conscription on schooling, with
eﬀects of a magnitude similar to those reported in studies of the WWII and Korean-era
GI Bills (Bound and Turner, 2002; Stanley, 2003). We argue that the net wage eﬀects
3Angrist (1989) estimated larger though imprecise eﬀects on white veteran’s wages using a smaller
sample. Estimates for nonwhites are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in either the 1989 and or 1990
studies.
4Although birthday information is not made publicly available, we have used it through an agreement
with the Census Bureau’s Center for Economic Studies.
2observed in the 2000 data can be explained by a ﬂattening of the experience proﬁle in
middle age and a modest return to the post-service schooling paid for by veterans beneﬁts.5
Adjusting the wage estimates for possible health consequences of military service matters
little for this story.
2 Data and First-Stage
2.1 The 2000 Census 1-in-6 File
The 2000 Census long form sample includes approximately one-sixth of US households.6
For the purposes of this study, we created an extract of US-born men residing in the 50
States and the District of Columbia, born between 1948 and 1953 or in subsets of these
birth years. The cohorts of 19-year-olds at risk of conscription in the draft lotteries were
born from 1950-52 so our analysis focuses on the sample of men in this group. This sample
includes about 700,000 whites and 96,000 nonwhites. There is a smaller but non-negligible
draft-lottery impact on men born in 1948 and 1949, so estimates are also reported for an
expanded sample of men born 1948-52. The 1948-52 sample includes more than 1.14
million whites and about 155,000 nonwhites. Finally, although no one born after 1952
was drafted, men born in 1953 were assigned RSNs and a few volunteered in anticipation
of possible conscription. We therefore report ﬁrst-stage estimates for the 1953 cohort.
R o u g h l y2 4p e r c e n to fm e nb o r n1 9 5 0t o1 9 5 2s e r v e di nt h eV i e t n a me r aa n da b o u t
38 percent were draft-eligible. These and other descriptive statistics appear in Table 1,
which reports means by veteran status and race for the 1950-52 sample. White veterans
from these cohorts have lower employment rates and earnings than white non-veterans,
while the pattern is reversed for nonwhites. For example, the annual 1999 earnings of
white veterans was about $39,500, while white non-veterans earned $48,500 that year.
5The ﬁrst attempt to estimate the returns to veterans post-service schooling is Griliches and Mason
(1972), who report results for a sample of WWII veterans from the 1964 CPS.
6The 1-in-6 long form sample is the basis for the publicly available PUMS ﬁles. These ﬁles, documented
in US Census Bureau (2005), are simple random samples drawn from the 1-in-6 ﬁle, though the 1-in-6
ﬁle is not a simple random sample from the census sampling frame. Rather, the Census Bureau reduces
the sampling rate in more densely populated areas. Adjustment for variation in sampling rates is made
here by using the weighting variables that are included in the long-form ﬁle. These weights adjust for
non-response as well as for non-random sampling, and are designed to match external population totals
by age, race, sex and Hispanic origin. In practice, weighting matters little for our results. We also
conﬁrmed that the means from publicly available data from the 1-in-6 ﬁle are close to those from the 5
percent ﬁle distributed through IPUMS. The original 2000 long form sample includes Puerto Rico and
island territories; residents of these areas are omitted from our study.
3Unemployment rates are low in both the veteran and non-veteran groups, but many men,
especially nonwhites, were out of the labor force.
Overall, the average schooling level in the sample is 13.8 years for whites and 12.6
years for nonwhites. The average years of college is 1.73 for whites and 1.02 for non-
whites.7 The contrast in average educational attainment by veteran status parallels that
in earnings, with white veterans obtaining less schooling and non-white veterans obtain-
ing more schooling than their non-veteran counterparts. On the other hand, although
white veterans are less likely to have attended or completed one or more years of college,
they are more likely than non-veterans to be high school graduates. For non-whites, the
schooling diﬀerential by veteran status changes in favor of non-veterans at the BA level
or higher.
A large number of men born in 1950-52 report having a work-related disability —
about 12 percent of whites and 21 percent of nonwhites. The proportion reporting other
disabilities, but no disability related to work, is 7 percent for whites and 12 percent for
nonwhites. The work and non-work disability variables used here are mutually exclusive.
Thus, a total of 19 percent of whites and 33 percent of nonwhites are aﬀected by some
kind of disability (i.e., the sum of work and non-work disability rates).8 White veterans
have somewhat higher disability rates than non-veterans, while disability rates diﬀer little
by veteran status for nonwhites.
Veterans below the age of 65 are eligible for two types of disability payments, service-
related veterans disability compensation (VDC) and means-tested military disability pen-
sions (MDP) for disabled low-income veterans. We therefore examine the eﬀects of
Vietnam-era service on two disability-related income variables: an “other income” variable
7Highest grade completed (HGC) was imputed from the categorical Census schooling variable us-
ing Jaeger (1997). Years of college ranges from 0-4 and was constructed from imputed HGC as
Min(Max(HGC-12,0), 4), similar to Bound and Turner (2002).
8The disability variables used here come from two questions on disabilities by type. Respondents were
asked: [Question 17] “Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting 6 months or more,
does this person have any diﬃculty in doing any of the following activities: (a) learning, remembering or
concentrating (b) dressing, bathing or getting around inside the home (c) going outside the home alone
to shop or visit a doctor’s oﬃce (d) working at a job or business?” The previous question [16] asks “Does
this person have any of the following long-lasting conditions: (a) Blindness, deafness, or a severe vision or
hearing impairment (b) A condition that substantially limits one or more basic physical activities such as
walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying?” We coded a work-related disability for those who
answered yes to (17d). Other disabilities were coded as follows: (16a) vision or hearing; (16b) physical;
(17a) mental; (17b) self-care; (17c) mobility. Respondents can have more than one disability. We coded
a non-work disability for anyone who responded yes to 16a, 16b, 17a, 17b, or 17c, i.e., they indicated
some disability, but no work-related disability (17d). We deﬁne the presence of any disability by the sum
of the work-related and non-work disability indicators.
4that includes VDC, and a non-Social-Security (SSA) "retirement and disability pension"
variable that includes MDP and regular military pensions.9 Table 1 shows much higher
amounts of disability-related income for veterans. This is almost certainly due to veterans
receiving VDC and MDP. In contrast, diﬀerences in SSDI and SSI amounts by veteran
status (not reported) are much smaller.
Table 1 focuses on men born 1950-52 because these cohorts were most aﬀected by the
draft lottery. As noted above, however, we also present results for an expanded sample
of men born 1948-52. Descriptive statistics for the 1948-52 sample and means by single
year of birth appear in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. The 1948 and 1949 cohorts were
more likely to serve in the Vietnam era than the 1950-52 group, with Vietnam-era service
rates peaking at 45 percent for whites born in 1948. Men born in 1953 were less likely to
serve, though many still did (14 percent of whites and 18 percent of nonwhites).
2.2 The Draft-Lottery First Stage
The ﬁrst draft lottery, held in December 1969, aﬀe c t e dm e nb o r ni n1 9 4 4 - 5 0w h ow e r e
at risk of conscription in 1970, while subsequent draft lotteries aﬀected 19-year-olds only.
Men born in 1951 were at risk of conscription in 1971 and men born in 1952 were at risk
of conscription in 1972. Men born in 1953 were assigned lottery numbers in 1972, but
there were no draft calls in 1973. Although men as old as 26 could have been drafted as
a result of the 1970 lottery, the risk of conscription for all cohorts aﬀected by a lottery
was limited to a single year.
Each lottery was associated with a draft-eligibility ceiling or cut-oﬀ.T h o s e w i t h a n
RSN below the ceiling were draft-eligible while those with an RSN above the ceiling were
draft-exempt. Draft-eligibility ceilings were 195 in the 1970 lottery, 125 in the 1971 lottery
and 95 in the 1972 lottery. Draft eligibility is highly correlated with Vietnam-era veteran
status, but the link is far from deterministic. Many men with draft lottery numbers
below the ceiling were able to avoid conscription (through an occupational or educational
deferment, or because of poor health or low test scores) while many with lottery numbers
above the ceiling volunteered for service. Throughout the Vietnam era (1964-1975), most
9The Census question regarding non-SSA retirement and disability income states “Do not include
Social Security,” while military pensions are presumably included. The “other income” question explicitly
mentions “VA payments,” which presumably includes VDC. In practice, veterans may confuse VDC and
MDP payments though they could not receive both before 2003. Another diﬀerence is that VDC is not
taxable while disability pensions are.
5soldiers were volunteers.
In the sample of men born 1950-52, the eﬀect of draft eligibility on Vietnam-era veteran
status is .145 for whites and .094 for nonwhites. These and other draft-eligibility eﬀects
are reported in the ﬁrst rows of Table 2 (Panel A for whites and Panel B for nonwhites).
The table also shows draft-eligibility eﬀects for the pooled sample of men born 1948-52.
These eﬀects are somewhat smaller than in the younger subsample (.11 for whites and
.072 for nonwhites) because the draft-eligibility ﬁr s t - s t a g ei ss m a l l e rf o rm e nb o r ni n1 9 4 8
a n d1 9 4 9t h a nf o rm e nb o r ni n1 9 5 0 . T h i si sn o ts u r p r i s i n gs i n c em a n yo ft h o s ew h o
served in the older cohorts had entered the military before the 1970 draft lottery. Table 2
also documents a small draft-eligibility ﬁrst stage for the 1953 cohort (about .031), where
draft-eligibility status was coded using the 1972 lottery cutoﬀ of 95. Because the eﬀect on
men born in 1953 is small, we omit this cohort from the empirical analysis that follows.
Draft-eligibility eﬀects for men born 1944-47 (not reported here) are smaller than those
for men born 1953 so we omit these cohorts as well.
The most important feature of the relationship between lottery numbers and military
service is the drop in the probability of service at the draft-eligibility cutoﬀ.T h i sc a nb e
seen in Figure 1, which plots nonparametric estimates of the conditional probability of
service given lottery numbers for men born 1950-53. The ﬁgure shows estimates smoothed
across 5-RSN cells by single year of birth, but the smoothing does not straddle the draft-
eligibility cutoﬀ in each cohort.10 The ﬁgure also documents modest variation in the
probability of service within draft-eligibility groups. Part of this variation is due to higher
voluntary enlistment rates among men with low lottery numbers — men who volunteered
could expect more choice regarding terms of service (e.g., choice of branch of service),
while draftees mostly served in the Army. Another important feature of Figure 1 is the
muted relationship between veteran status and lottery numbers for nonwhites. Angrist
(1991) shows that this can be explained by the fact that nonwhites were more likely than
whites to consider military service an attractive career option.
2.2.1 Additional Instrument Sets
In addition to just-identiﬁed estimates using a dummy for draft-eligibility status as the
single instrument, we also constructed instruments from a set of ﬁve lottery-group dum-
mies. These were chosen to match draft-eligibility cutoﬀs for each cohort, with allowance
10Estimates were smoothed using lowess with a bandwidth of .4 and a standard tricube weighting
function.
6for additional draft-motivated enlistment as high as RSN 230. The 5z instrument set for
individual i is {z1i,z 2i,z 3i,z 4i,z 5i} where
z1i = I[RSNi ≤ 95],
z2i = I[95 <R S N i ≤ 125],
z3i = I[125 <R S N i ≤ 160],
z4i = I[160 <R S N i ≤ 195],
z5i = I[195 <R S N i ≤ 230],
and I[·] is the indicator function. This allows for kinks at each draft-eligibility cutoﬀ,
while breaking the set of lottery numbers up into roughly equal-sized groups between
RSN 95, the lowest cut-oﬀ,a n dR S N2 3 0 ,b e y o n dw h i c ht h ee ﬀect of lottery numbers on
enlistment is negligible. Note that a draft-eligibility dummy (eligi) can be constructed
from the elements of 5z as follows
eligi = z1i + I[YOB i ≤ 51](z2i)+I[YOB i ≤ 50](z3i + z4i)
where YOB i is i’s year of birth. This shows that eligi i saf u n c t i o no fb o t hl o t t e r y - n u m b e r
main eﬀects and interactions with year of birth.
The ﬁrst two columns in each panel of Table 2 report estimates of the 5z ﬁrst stage
in pooled samples.11 These estimates are from models without year-of-birth interaction
terms. For example, column 1 shows that men born 1950-52 with RSNs up to 95 were
.16 more likely to serve than men with RSNs above 230 (the reference group). The next
group, with RSN 96-125, was .091 more likely to serve than the reference group; the next
group was .059 more likely to serve; the next group after that was .04 more likely to
serve; and the last group with RSN 196-230 was .0065 more likely to serve. All of these
ﬁrst-stage eﬀects are precisely estimated and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As with
the draft-eligibility eﬀects, estimates of 5z eﬀects are consistently smaller for nonwhites
than for whites. F-statistics in the pooled 1950-52 and 1948-52 samples range from 134
for nonwhites to over 2400 for whites.
The 5z instrument set without year of birth interactions does not produce more precise
2SLS estimates than eligi alone. We therefore report estimates using an instrument set,
labeled 5zx,t h a ti n t e r a c t s5z with year of birth. The 5zx set includes 15 instruments
11The estimates in Table 2 and the second-stage estimates that follow control for year of birth, State
of birth, and month of birth.
7for the 1950-52 sample and 25 instruments for the 1948-52 sample. The 5zx ﬁrst stage
appears in columns 3-7 of Table 2. This ﬁrst stage documents a modest role for draft-
motivated enlistment. For example, even though the 1971 draft-eligibility cutoﬀ was 125,
men born in 1951 with lottery numbers between 126 and 160 were .05 more likely to serve
than men with lottery numbers above 230.
Finally, when estimating the returns to schooling, we tried an instrument set (called
7zx) that adds two RSN dummies plus year-of-birth interactions to 5zx. The additional
instruments are dummies for RSN 1-30 and RSN 31-60. Most of our substantive conclu-
sions, however, are based on just-identiﬁed models or models estimated with a low degree
of over identiﬁcation.12
2.3 Sample Selection Issues
A ﬁnal issue before turning to the second-stage estimates is the possibility of selection
bias due to excess mortality among draft-eligible men. There are two likely channels
for this. The ﬁrst is war-related deaths, since civilian samples are limited to those who
survived the war. The second is elevated post-service mortality due to physical injury,
PTSD, or other long-term consequences of military service such as an increased likelihood
of cigarette smoking (as suggested by Bedard and Deschenes, 2006, for WWII veterans).
Roughly 47,000 men died as a result of hostile action in the Vietnam Era (1964-75)
while 8.7 million personnel served in the military during this period. Overall casualty
rates among Vietnam-era veterans were low in part because less than half of active duty
p e r s o n n e ls e r v e di nI n d o c h i n a ,a n dm a n ys e r v e di np o s i t i o n sn o te x p o s e dt oc o m b a t .
Although causality rates among draftees were higher than the overall death rate (because
most draftees served in the Army), draftees accounted for a minority of combat deaths.
Moreover, over 80 percent of combat deaths occurred before 1970.13 It therefore seems
unlikely that war-related deaths have a large eﬀect on the composition of the sample used
in our study.
An increase in civilian mortality for veterans seems more likely than combat deaths
12As it turns out, 7zx adds little to the precision obtained with 5zx, so we use the larger instrument set
only for the Mincer equation. Likewise, a non-parametric ﬁrst stage using the ﬁtted values from Figure
1 fails to generate a meaningful gain in precision relative to 5zx.
13Service and casualty statistics are from Table 583 in the 2000 Statistical Abstract, available on-line at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec11.pdf. Data on casualties by year are available from
the national archives: http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#year.
Statistics on service in Indochina and exposure to combat are from Hearst, Newman and Hulley (1986).
8to aﬀect the composition of post-Vietnam samples, especially in view of Hearst, Newman
and Hulley’s (1986) ﬁndings of elevated civilian mortality for draft-eligible men. The
excess deaths in the Hearst, Newman and Hulley study are due to suicide and motor
vehicle accidents, possibly related to PTSD.
As a simple check on the possibility of mortality-related selection bias, we compared
the actual and expected number of draft-eligible men in the 2000 Census by race and year
of birth. Following Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986), the expected ratio is computed
assuming birthdays (and hence lottery numbers) are uniformly distributed. Overall, draft-
eligible men are represented in the census sample almost exactly as predicted assuming
a uniform distribution of lottery numbers. Among whites, the predicted proportion eli-
gible is .40553, while the empirical proportion eligible is .40539. Among nonwhites, the
proportion eligible is more than predicted, .4085 versus .4038.
Comparisons by single year of birth for white men born 1948-53, reported in detail in
Appendix Table A3, show draft-eligible men slightly over-represented in three cohorts and
slightly under-represented in 3 cohorts (one of these is the 1953 cohort, with no draftees).
Some of these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant, though all are small. Only one out of six cohort-
speciﬁc contrasts is signiﬁcant for nonwhites, with slightly more eligibles than predicted
for nonwhites born in 1950. Given the size and sign pattern of these comparisons, it seems
unlikely that excess civilian mortality has a substantial eﬀect on the composition of the
2000 Census sample. This analysis also weighs against the view that Vietnam-era service
led to elevated civilian mortality. We return to this point in Section 5.
3 Labor-Market Eﬀects
We look ﬁrst at employment and earnings. The results reported here are 2SLS estimates
of the parameter α in the equation
Yi = w
0
iβ + αvi + εi, (1)
where Yi is an outcome variable; vi is veteran status; and wi is a vector of covariates that
includes year of birth dummies, state of birth dummies, and month of birth dummies.
Year of birth is a necessary control in models identiﬁed by the exclusion of draft-eligibility
since older men were more likely to be eligible. Month of birth adjusts for any bias arising
from the fact that the 1970 lottery, the only one to use physical randomization, resulted
in an RSN sequence correlated with month of birth (in practice this does not appear to
9be important). State of birth is a natural pre-treatment control, inclusion of which might
increase the precision of second-stage estimates. As a benchmark, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates of equation (1) are also reported.
As discussed in Angrist (1990), 2SLS estimates of equations like (1) capture the eﬀect
of service on those who were drafted or who volunteered in the face of draft risk. These men
are draft-lottery compliers in the sense of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996): they served
in the Vietnam era because they were assigned a low lottery number but would not have
served otherwise. The average causal eﬀect for compliers is the local average treatment
eﬀect (LATE) captured by draft-lottery instruments (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
Most soldiers from the Vietnam period were not compliers; rather, they were true
volunteers because they were not drafted and because they did not volunteer to avoid
conscription.14 Estimates using draft-lottery instruments need not generalize to the pop-
ulation of true volunteers. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of military service on those compelled
to serve against their will reﬂect the historical consequences of conscription. These es-
timates are also relevant for contemporary discussions of military manpower policy since
compliers in the future are likely to be similar to those from the draft-lottery period.15
Moreover, given an economic mechanism that explains the eﬀects of Vietnam-era service
( s u c ha sl o s te x p e r i e n c e ) ,w em i g h td r a wb r o a der conclusions as to how conscription af-
fects soldiers, though these conclusions require stronger assumptions than an analysis of
the causal eﬀect of Vietnam-era conscription per se.
Draft-lottery estimates constructed using the 2000 Census show little evidence of an
eﬀect of Vietnam-era conscription on the labor market outcomes of whites. This can be
seen in Panel A of Table 3, which reports estimates of eﬀects on labor market status
and earnings using diﬀerent instrument sets. For example, 2SLS estimation using draft-
eligibility status as an instrument in the sample of white men born 1950-52 generates
14The proportion of veterans who were compliers can be calculated as follows: let v1i denote i’s veteran
status if i is draft eligible (eligi =1 )a n dv0i denote i’s veteran status if i is ineligible (eligi =0 ). Random
assignment makes eligi independent of {v1i,v 0i}. Veteran status is vi = v0i+eligi(v1i−v0i) and compliers
have v1i −v0i =1 . Given monotonicity, v1i ≥ v0i, so the proportion of draft-eligibility compliers is given
by the draft-eligibility ﬁrst stage, P[v1i − v0i =1 ]=E[v1i − v0i]=E[vi|eligi =1 ]− E[vi|eligi =0 ] .T h e
proportion of veterans who are draft-eligibility compliers is P[v1i − v0i|vi =1 ]=P[vi =1 |v1i − v0i =
1]P[v1i − v0i =1 ] /P[vi =1 ]=P[eligi =1 ] P[v1i − v0i =1 ] /P[vi =1 ] . For white men born 1950-52, this
is .376(.145/.236) = .231.
15The Selective Service System web site indicates that "if a draft were held today," it would involve a
lottery over 19-year olds. There would be few deferments, as in the Vietnam-era lottery, with at most
a one-semester deferment for enrolled students. And it seems likely that any future draft would come
in wartime. Finally, as in the Vietnam era, those conscripted would be men who do not ﬁnd GI Bill
education beneﬁts enough of an inducement to volunteer. See http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm.
10eﬀects of -.0043 (s.e.=.0072) on employment and -517 (s.e.=1240) on earnings. The cor-
responding estimates in the sample of white men born 1948-52 are -.0047 (s.e.=.0072)
and -115 (s.e.=1243). Estimates of eﬀects on log weekly wages, computed for the sam-
ple of men with positive earnings, are similarly small. In contrast, the OLS estimates
in columns 2 and 6 show that veteran status is associated with substantially worse labor
market outcomes and lower employment rates. The OLS estimates, about -7,900 to -8,600
for annual earnings and -11 percent to -12 percent of weekly wages, are outside the 2SLS
conﬁdence intervals.
The pattern of OLS estimates is reversed for nonwhites, with veterans more likely to
be working and earning more than non-veterans. But the 2SLS estimates in Panel B of
Table 3 oﬀer no evidence of a causal eﬀect on the employment or earnings of nonwhites
- the estimated earnings eﬀects for nonwhites are positive but insigniﬁcant. It should
be noted, however, that the 2SLS estimates for nonwhites are considerably less precise
than those for whites due both to a smaller sample and a weaker ﬁrst-stage. Using draft
eligibility as an instrument, the estimated eﬀect of Vietnam-era service on the log weekly
wages of nonwhites born 1950-52 is -.037 with a standard error of .067. Some of the
estimated eﬀects on weeks and hours worked by nonwhites are positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, e.g., an increase of 3.7 hours per week in column 7 (s.e.=1.7). There
is also some evidence of reduced unemployment for nonwhites in the 1948-52 sample. On
the other hand, there is little evidence of a corresponding increase in employment while
the estimated eﬀects on weeks worked by nonwhites are positive but insigniﬁcant. On
balance, therefore, the results for nonwhites seem inconclusive, though perhaps leaning
towards positive long-run eﬀects.
Finally, it’s noteworthy that the 5zx instrument set incorporating 5 lottery-number
dummies with a full set of year-of-birth interactions produces only slightly more precise
estimates than eligi alone. The most noticeable precision gains appear in the 1948-52
sample. For example, the standard error for the eﬀect on earnings in the sample of
whites born 1948-52 falls from 1243 to 1133, with similar coeﬃcient estimates. The
standard error for the eﬀect on log wages changes by only .01 in this sample, from .16 to
.15.
113.1 Experience and Earnings
The 2SLS estimates in Table 3 contrast with the earnings losses reported for white veterans
in Angrist (1990), which range from 10-15 percent of FICA-taxable earnings in 1981-84.
The results from the 2000 Census can be reconciled with these earlier results if the costs
of conscription are due primarily by lost labor market experience. By 2000, the draft
lottery cohorts had reached middle age, when experience proﬁles are fairly ﬂat, so the
veteran penalty should have faded. The empirical support for this argument comes from
a Mincer-style wage equation, which can be written as
yi = β0 + β1xi + β2x
2
i + ρsi + ui, (2)
where yi is the log weekly wage, si is years of schooling, xi is potential work experience,
and ui is a random component in the human capital earnings function. Potential work
experience is assumed to vary with veteran status, vi,a c c o r d i n gt o
xi = agei − si − 6 − vi  = xi − vi , (3)
where xi is potential experience for non-veterans. In other words, veterans have   fewer
y e a r so fe x p e r i e n c et h a nn o n - v e t e r a n so ft h es a m ea g ea n dw i t ht h es a m ee d u c a t i o n a l
attainment.
Equations (2) and (3) lead to a model with an additive veteran eﬀect and an interaction
term between vi and xi. Re-arranging, we have
yi = β0 + β1xi + β2x
2
i + ρsi + πxivi + ui, (4)
where πxi = π1 + π2xi and
π1 = −[β1  − β2 
2] (5a)
π2 = −2β2 . (5b)
Fitting this model to log earnings from 1978-1984, Angrist (1990) estimated  =2.08
(s.e.=.38), with an experience proﬁle such that π1 = −.225,a n dπ2 = .011. In other
words, veterans start out at a -.225 wage disadvantage, but the gap closes by .011 each
year. The veteran earnings gap is zero when xi ≈ 20.5 or agei ≈ 39 for high school
graduates (older for those with more education).
The pure loss-of-experience model generates a restriction linking π1 and π2.A n
unrestricted model allows the linear potential experience term to vary with veteran status
12according to β1i = β10+β11vi,w h e r eβ11 is most likely negative. This can be rationalized
by the Ben-Porath (1967) model of human capital investment with a ﬁnite horizon, since
military service shortens the period of return on investment. The relationship between
equation (4) and the human capital earnings function then becomes
π1 = −[(β10 + β11)  − β2 
2] (6a)
π2 = −[2β2  − β11]. (6b)
Since β11 is an additional free parameter, equations (6a) and (6b) impose no restrictions
on (4). The unrestricted estimates are  =1.84 (s.e.=.43), π1 = −.189,a n dπ2 = .006.I n
this case, the veteran earnings gap disappears when xi = .189/.006 = 31.5 or agei ≈ 50
for those with a high school diploma.
A key implication of both the restricted and unrestricted loss-of-experience models
is that by the time of the 2000 Census, the veteran earnings gap should have largely
closed and perhaps even reversed. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the proﬁles
estimated from equation (4) assuming veteran status operates to reduce experience as in
(3). The upper panel of the ﬁgure, based on the unrestricted model allowing veterans
to have a proﬁle with lower slope, shows veteran and non-veteran proﬁles converging by
about 2000, while the restricted model has veterans converging sooner. In both cases,
however, the broad picture is of a shrinking veteran wage penalty.16 A second force that
appears to have contributed to the closing veteran wage gap is schooling, discussed in the
next section.
4E ﬀects on Schooling
Compulsory military service appears to have increased the educational attainment of
Vietnam-era veterans, a result documented in Table 4a. For example, the 2SLS esti-
mates using eligi in the 1950-52 sample suggest that white veterans got .33 more years of
schooling than nonveterans. The corresponding results are slightly lower in the 1948-52
sample, but change little when estimated with an expanded instrument list. Both samples
generate precise estimates, with standard errors on the order of .05. In contrast with the
results for whites, however, the estimates for nonwhites are smaller, mostly below .2, and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
16Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) report an estimated earnings loss of about 5 percent for Dutch
conscripts ten years after their service. This is consistent with the earnings penalty that might be expected
from lost experience given the short period of service in Holland.
13The remainder of Table 4a shows that the increase in highest grade completed for
white veterans is primarily the result of more years of college, with precisely estimated
eﬀects ranging from .24-.27. More speciﬁcally, veterans were more likely to attend college
(including partial years) or to earn an associate’s degree. These eﬀects are on the order of
.06-.08. The increase in the likelihood of completing a BA degree is smaller though still
marked, at around .05. Perhaps surprisingly, there is also a small eﬀect on high school
completion (roughly 2 percentage points) and a very small eﬀect on upper secondary
grade completion. These eﬀects may be due to GEDs obtained by veterans without a
high school diploma. In addition, since the 1990s, many states have oﬀered Vietnam-era
veterans honorary high school diplomas solely on the basis of their military service.17
The 2SLS estimates are summarized in Figure 3, which plots the coeﬃcient estimates
for the 1948-52 sample reported in Table 4a (as well as some not reported in the table),
along with pointwise conﬁdence bands. There is a clear jump in the eﬀects on post-high
school schooling levels, with a drop at the BA level. The ﬁgure also highlights the much
smaller and mostly insigniﬁcant shift in the schooling distribution for nonwhite veterans.
The single (marginally) signiﬁcant eﬀect on nonwhites’ education is for the likelihood of
obtaining some college (but less than a full year). Finally, unlike the 2SLS estimates, OLS
estimates with controls for state, month, and year of birth (reported in columns 2 and 6)
show white veterans with fewer years of schooling and less post-secondary education. In
view of the 2SLS estimates, this would seem to be an artifact of selection bias.
4.1 GI Bill Beneﬁts vs. Draft Deferments
The schooling shifts documented in Table 4a and Figure 3 are most likely a consequence of
the Vietnam-era GI Bill, which oﬀered stipends similar in generosity to those available to
veterans of WWII and Korea.18 Vietnam veterans were especially likely to have used the
GI Bill for education and training. Data from the 2001 Survey of Veterans (SOV) show
17Angrist and Krueger (1992) look at the relation between lottery numbers and education using data
from the 1979-85 CPS’s. These results are too imprecise to detect eﬀects on schooling of the size reported
here. Moreover, some of the veteran schooling advantage seems likely to have accumulated after Angrist
and Krueger’s (1992) sample period.
18The WWII GI Bill included a 500 tuition beneﬁt and a monthly stipend. In the 1970s, the Vietnam-
era GI Bill paid full-time students a stipend almost identical in value to the WWII package (adjusting
for inﬂation) and more generous than the Korean-era full-time stipend. These beneﬁt levels were almost
double the average cost of tuition, room, and board at 4-year public universities in this period. The real
value of the Vietnam-era GI Bill declined in the 1980s, but remained above the cost of tuition, room, and
board (Data from authors’ tabulations and Bound and Turner, 2002).
14that among whites, 44 and 42 percent of WWII and Korean-era veterans used beneﬁts
for education and training, while the usage rate was 50 percent for Vietnam-era veterans.
Vietnam-era veterans were also more likely than earlier cohorts to have used their beneﬁts
for college course work: 63 percent of Vietnam-era GI Bill beneﬁciaries used beneﬁts for
college courses, while the corresponding ﬁgures for WWII and Korean-era beneﬁtu s e r s
are 53 and 56 percent.19
The notion that the GI Bill increased schooling is supported by a number of earlier
studies. For example, Bound and Turner’s (2002) preferred IV estimates of the eﬀects
of WWII service on college completion by white men are around 5-6 percentage points
while their preferred estimates of eﬀects on years of college range from .23-.28. Stanley’s
(2003) estimates of the eﬀects of the Korean-era GI Bill eligibility on college completion
are also on the order of 5-6 percentage points while his estimates of eﬀects on years of
college range from .20-.33. The college completion eﬀects reported in Table 4a are a little
over 5 points for whites and range from .24-.27 for years of college, remarkably similar
to the Bound and Turner (2002) and Stanley estimates. The estimates in Table 4a also
echo Turner and Bound (2003) in that they show larger eﬀects of the GI Bill on whites
than nonwhites. Finally, Lemieux and Card (2001) report eﬀects of a similar magnitude
in cohorts that beneﬁtted from the Canadian GI Bill, while Angrist (1993) ﬁnds large
post-service schooling increases associated with the use of the Vietnam-era GI Bill.20
The leading alternative explanation for schooling eﬀects estimated using draft-lottery
instruments is draft-avoidance behavior through education-related draft deferments. In
the 1960s, college students could delay and eventually escape conscription by staying in
school. Men with low draft lottery numbers may therefore have been more likely to stay
in college or to enroll in college, hoping to avoid service through an educational deferment.
Weighing against this possibility is the fact that the importance of educational deferments
19The pattern for nonwhite veterans is similar, though the levels are lower. GI Bill statistics in this
paragraph are from the authors’ tabulation of responses to the 2001 SOV. For purposes of this comparison,
samples of veterans were limited to the principle birth cohorts who served in each era (years of birth with
at least 100 observations in the SOV).
20The BEOG program (Pell grants) also played an important role in expanding college attendance for
adult students in the 1970s (see, e.g., Seftor and Turner 2002), but Vietnam veterans were not especially
likely to have received Pell grants. Among male Vietnam veterans aged 35-39 in the SOV of 1987 (roughly
the cohorts of the 2000 Census), 54 percent had used the GI Bill, while only 7.4 percent reported having
received any federal (non-Veteran) aid, and only 2.3 percent received federal grants (including Pell grants).
The overlap with Pell grants is small because Pell was means-tested while the GI Bill was not and because
half of the GI Bill beneﬁt amount was counted as income when determining Pell grant eligibility (U.S.
Congressional Budget Oﬃce 1978, p.24).
15declined sharply during the draft-lottery period.21
4.2 Additional Evidence on the GI Bill Hypothesis
Estimates of schooling eﬀects by single year of birth, reported in Table 4b, also weigh
against draft deferment as the primary force behind the schooling eﬀects in Table 4a. In
particular, Table 4b shows that in spite of the decreasing availability of college deferments
from 1970 onwards, the estimated eﬀects on highest grade completed and years of college
are substantial for white men born in 1951 and 1952. The largest eﬀects of military service
on these two schooling variables are for the 1951 cohort, few of whom would have been
deferred for long. Estimates of eﬀects on highest grade completed and years of college for
the 1952 cohort (which had no access to college deferments) are smaller, but similar in
magnitude or larger than the estimated eﬀects on white men born from 1948-50.
Diﬀerences across cohorts in the 2SLS estimates of eﬀects on some-college dummies
mirror the diﬀerences in estimates of eﬀects on highest grade completed and years of
college. For example, the estimated eﬀect on a dummy variable indicating one or more
years of college falls from .105 for the 1951 cohort to .068 for the 1952 cohort. On the
other hand, the BA eﬀect is larger for the 1952 cohort than for the 1950 cohort, in spite of
the latter’s wider access to college deferments. It’s also worth noting that the estimates
by single year of birth for nonwhites, though imprecise, are typically larger for younger
cohorts than old. On balance, therefore, Table 4b points away from draft deferment as
the primary explanation for the results in Table 4a.
Schooling Trends in the CPS
A second piece of evidence supporting the GI Bill explanation of increased schooling
among Vietnam veterans comes from the Current Population Surveys (CPS). This ev-
idence is based on a model that divides total educational attainment into three parts:
pre-service schooling for veterans or schooling completed as of the typical entry age for
non-veterans ( sA
i ); schooling acquired between the typical entry and discharge ages (∆sB
i );
and the diﬀerence between completed schooling and the schooling completed at the typical
21The decline in the role played by college deferments is reﬂected in the cohort- and sex- speciﬁc
enrollment rates analyzed by Card and Lemieux (2001). Their analysis shows no deviation from trend
in the male-to-female college graduate ratio or the proportion with some college in cohorts born 1950 or
later. For institutional background related to draft deferments, see the chronology in Selective Service
System Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs (1986) and Semiannual Reports of the Director of the Selective Service
System from the early 1970s.
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We think of sA
i as schooling at age 20, sA
i +∆sB
i as schooling at age 24, and si as schooling
at around age 40 when GI Bill eligibility expired for the cohorts studied here.
Military service has a causal eﬀect on ∆sB
i and ∆sC
i , while sA
i is a "pre-treatment"
variable. To make this explicit, let ∆sB
i (v) denote the potential schooling acquired during
the service period, where v =0 ,1 indexes veteran status. Similarly, let ∆sC
i (v) denote the
potential schooling acquired in the post-service period. Veteran and non-veteran potential
schooling increments are deﬁned for all i regardless of veteran status.
Most soldiers get no schooling in the military (∆sB
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We also assume that non-veterans complete their education by the time most veterans
are discharged, so that ∆sC






Combining these two assumptions with the decomposition in (7), the causal eﬀect of
veteran status on an individual veteran’s schooling is [∆sC
i (1) − ∆sB
i (0)]. The average
causal eﬀect of military service on veterans’ schooling is
E[∆s
C
i (1) − ∆s
B
i (0)|vi =1 ]=E[∆s
C
i (1)|vi =1 ]− E[∆s
B
i (0)|vi =1 ] . (8)
Military service increases average education when post-discharge increases in schooling
are enough to overcome the education lost while serving.
We measure E[∆sC
i (1)−∆sB
i (0)|vi =1 ]directly using CPS data from 1964-1991. This
covers the period from the beginning of the Vietnam era to just beyond the expiration
of Vietnam-era GI Bill entitlements in 1989. Under the assumptions given here, the
veteran/nonveteran diﬀerence in schooling growth from entry age to completion is
E[si − s
A
i |vi =1 ]− E[si − s
A
i |vi =0 ]=E[∆s
C
i (1)|vi =1 ]− E[∆s
B
i (0)|vi =0 ] . (9)
Assuming E[∆sB
i (0)|vi =0 ]=E[∆sB
i (0)|vi =1 ] , that is, the schooling veterans would
have obtained during their service years had they not served is equal to the schooling
17non-veterans obtained at the same ages, equation (9) is the average causal eﬀect of vet-
eran status on schooling expressed in equation (8). However, the schooling non-veterans
obtained during the service period, E[∆sB
i (0)|vi =0 ] , probably exceeded the schooling
veterans lost while in the military, E[∆sB
i (0)|vi =1 ] . Thus, the empirical counterpart of
(9) is an underestimate of (8).
In line with this reasoning, CPS data show that the educational attainment of Viet-
nam veterans born 1948-52 increased relatively little when these men were in their early
twenties, while the schooling of non-veterans the same age was rising sharply. On the
other hand, while the age-schooling proﬁle of non-veterans ﬂattened relatively early, the
schooling of Vietnam veterans continued to increase when these men were in their thir-
ties. This can be seen in Figure 4, which plots educational attainment by age and veteran
status. A drawback of the CPS for our purposes is that most active duty soldiers are not
in the sampling frame so we miss many veterans. The ﬁgure therefore shows two panels,
constructed with and without those active duty soldiers who are included in the CPS (this
includes soldiers stationed in the US, living oﬀ-base or with their families). The schooling
proﬁles in both versions exhibit a similar pattern.22
As a comparison, Figure 4 also shows schooling proﬁles for veterans and non-veterans
from Korean-war cohorts. These are similar to the Vietnam-era proﬁles at the same ages.
Interestingly, however, while Vietnam veterans had less schooling than Korea veterans
around the time Vietnam veterans were discharged, by the end of the period covered
in the ﬁgure, Vietnam veterans were more educated than Korean-era veterans and had
largely closed the gap with non-veterans their same age.
The empirical counterpart of equation (9) appears in Figure 5. Panel A plots the
diﬀerence in average education by veteran status at each age. The diﬀerences for single
years of age were smoothed using either a two-year or three-year moving average. The
ﬁgure highlights the rapidly increasing and then shrinking veteran/non-veteran schooling
diﬀerential.23
Panel B plots the veteran/nonveteran diﬀerence in the moving average of schooling,
relative to the average over the ﬁrst two or three years of age in Panel A. We think of this
22A detailed description of the data and methods used to construct Figures 4 and 5 appears in the
appendix.
23The sample used here includes active-duty CPS respondents. The absence of most active-duty soldiers
probably tends to bias the average schooling for veterans upwards at young ages since some of those
counted as veterans may have returned to school while active-duty soldiers have not yet had the chance
to do so.
18as the veteran/nonveteran diﬀerence in schooling growth, i.e., after subtracting the average
of sA
i for each group This plot shows that relative to each group’s entry-period schooling
level, veterans’ schooling grew more than nonveterans’. The corresponding diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates using (9) are on the order of .1-.3 years of schooling depending on
the moving average window and the width of the age range in the terminal group. Thus,
our analysis of CPS data on schooling trends comes down remarkably close to the 2SLS
estimates of the eﬀect of veteran status on schooling using draft lottery instruments. These
estimates can be explained by Vietnam veterans’ relatively large increase in educational
attainment after their service.
5 Other outcomes
Changes in health provide an additional channel whereby military service may have af-
fected earnings. Health eﬀects are especially a concern in view of Hearst, Newman and
Hulley’s (1986) pioneering draft-lottery study, which found elevated civilian mortality
risk among draft-eligible men. As noted in Section 2, however, we found no evidence
that draft-eligible men are disproportionately missing in the 2000 Census, as might be
expected if Vietnam veterans suﬀered excess mortality. A number of recent studies using
the draft lottery also report less evidence of adverse health consequences than appear in
Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986).24
The mixed evidence for health consequence of Vietnam-era service notwithstanding,
the possibility that military service aﬀected health is a clear concern in principle. Veterans
may have been injured in combat, either physically or as a result of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Many Vietnam veterans have also been concerned about exposure to
the Agent Orange defoliant used by American forces. Finally, the loss of earnings associ-
ated with Vietnam-era conscription may itself have been debilitating. We therefore look
directly at disability outcomes in the Census. As detailed in the discussion of Table 1,
24Goldberg, Richards, Anderson, and Rodin (1991) found no evidence of increased alcohol consumption
among draft-eligible men. Dobkin and Shabani (2006), using draft-lottery instruments, conclude that
there is no clear evidence for eﬀects of Vietnam-era service on a range of health outcomes. Hearst,
Buehler, Newman and Rutherford (1991), using draft-lottery instruments, found no increase in AIDS
among Vietnam-era veterans. Bedard and Deschenes (2006) suggest that WWII service increased smoking
and smoking-related disease, probably because WWII veterans were given free cigarettes. This was not
true in the Vietnam era, however. Eisenberg and Rowe (2007), using draft-lottery instruments, ﬁnd some
evidence of increased smoking in the immediate post-Vietnam period, but the eﬀects are imprecise and
disappear in later data. They also ﬁnd no evidence of eﬀects on other health outcomes.
19the Census disability variables include self-reported disability status and disability-related
income.
The 2SLS estimates of eﬀects on disability outcomes in Table 5 suggest that Vietnam-
era conscription increased self-reported disability rates among white veterans. The esti-
mated eﬀects on the likelihood of reporting a non-work disability in the 1948-52 sample,
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, are around .013 for whites.25 Both of the 2SLS
eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, with standard errors on the order of .005.
Among individual disability categories, the largest eﬀects are on mobility-related disabili-
ties. On the other hand, the 2SLS estimates show no evidence of an impact on work-related
disability rates, as can be seen in the ﬁrst row of Table 5. There is also little evidence
of an eﬀect on disability for nonwhites, with (marginally) signiﬁcant estimates for one
outcome only (vision or hearing).
The 2SLS estimates also suggest that compulsory military service increased the amount
of disability-related income received by white veterans. The estimates for whites range
from about $270-300 for the Other Income variable that includes VDC, with a .04 increase
in the likelihood of receipt, to $480-560 for the Retirement and Disability income variable
that includes MDP, with a .03 increase in the likelihood of receipt. All of these estimates
are reasonably precise. The 2SLS estimates of eﬀects on disability-related income variables
for nonwhites are roughly double those for whites but considerably less precise and only
marginally signiﬁcant.
The increased receipt of disability-related income reported in Table 5 is partly a me-
chanical phenomenon since only veterans are eligible for VDC and MDP. On the other
hand, the higher disability rates reported in Table 5 may reﬂect a negative causal im-
pact on health for white veterans. Weighing against this is the absence of an eﬀect of
Vietnam-era service on work-related disability, a seeming inconsistency. A second ﬁnding
inconsistent with an adverse long-term health impact of service is the absence of an eﬀect
on employment outcomes: the disability increase reported in Table 5 for whites does not
appear to translate into lower employment rates, higher unemployment, or reduced hours
and weeks worked, as would usually be expected for disabled workers (see Table 3). Es-
pecially striking is the fact that nonwhite veterans have more disability-related income,
while also appearing to work more.
Given these inconsistencies, the estimated impact on disability rates for veterans may
25Estimates for the sample of men born 1950-52 are similar.
20reﬂect, at least in part, the ﬁnancial incentives in the veterans’ compensation system. As
Autor and Duggan (2007) have noted, veterans have a strong incentive to claim beneﬁts
b e c a u s eV D Ci sn o tt a x e dt oo ﬀset earnings (though MDPs are means-tested). Moreover,
Duggan, Rosenheck and Singleton (2007) show that enrollment in the VDC program
seems highly sensitive to small changes in eligibility criteria and to the unemployment rate.
Claims for civilian Social Security Disability Insurance have similarly been linked to labor-
market conditions for low-skilled men (Autor and Duggan, 2003). The growth in VDC
claims has been large enough to raise questions about the VA’s disability determination
process. A recent VA study investigates the growth in VDC claims from 1999-2004 and
the large variation in these claims across states.26
Disability Trends in the CPS
To get an independent look at trends in veterans health and disability income, we tabu-
lated the amount and proportion receiving income from the VA (including VDC) and the
amount and proportion receiving non-Social-Security disability income (including MDP)
in the CPS. The results are plotted by year and veteran status for Vietnam and Korea
cohorts in Figures 6 and 7. Few nonveterans have income in either the VA or disability
categories while both Korea and Vietnam-era veterans have substantial amounts. Impor-
tantly, the proportion of Vietnam-era veterans with VA and disability income appears to
jump in the late 1990s, a striking change in comparison with the ﬂatter or declining trend
for Korea veterans.
Direct measures of self-reported disability rates and the likelihood of fair-to-poor
health, plotted in Figure 8, also show a jump for Vietnam veterans around the same
time that disability income went up. This might signal a deterioration in the health
of Vietnam veterans, but the suddenness of the recent increase in both disability rates
and the receipt of disability income suggests that policy or regulatory changes may play
a role. It is also worth noting that the causality between self-reported disability and
26Among other things, the success rates and the amount awarded to VDC claimants appear to be
associated with the likelihood that claimants used power-of-attorney representatives from veterans service
organizations (VA, 2005). Also related is the fact that diabetes claims for Vietnam veterans jumped
sharply after a 2001 VA ruling allowing diabetes to be treated as service-related (based on evidence
linking diabetes to Agent Orange; see Autor and Duggan, 2007). This ruling is unlikely to aﬀect disability
outcomes in the 2000 Census. On the other hand, PTSD claims by Vietnam veterans grew 18 percent
from 1999 to 2001, before the events of September 11 (Veterans Beneﬁts Administration, 2000 and 2002).
In 2001, PTSD was the second-largest category of Vietnam-era claims and three-quarters of all PTSD
claims were by Vietnam veterans.
21disability income can run in both directions; a deterioration in cohort health may have
increased claims, but increases in VDC awards may also increase the likelihood that vet-
erans categorize themselves as disabled or as suﬀering from poor health in government
surveys (the disability question in the CPS is a screener for questions about disability
income). On balance, therefore, it seems fair to interpret the data on disability outcomes
as inconclusive.
6 Schooling, Experience and Earnings
Here, we bring the experience and schooling channels together in a Mincer-style wage
equation. We are especially interested in the economic return to the extra schooling
veterans received as a consequence of the GI Bill. In view of the disability eﬀects reported
in the previous section, we also explore models that allow for higher disability rates among
Vietnam-era veterans.
The empirical framework in this section is similar to that outlined in equations (2) and
(3), with additional exogenous covariates (month of birth and state of birth). Veteran
status is assumed to aﬀect wages by reducing potential experience xi and increasing
schooling si, but with no direct eﬀects. The loss of experience associated with veteran
status is ﬁxed at 2 years, as estimated in Angrist (1990) and consistent with the terms
of service for draftees. The equation of interest has three endogenous variables: xi, x2
i
and si. Age and cohort eﬀects are assumed to be captured by the potential-experience
quadratic so that age or year of birth is available as an instrument.27
Estimates of equation (2) are reported in Table 6 for the sample of white men born
1948-52. We focus on whites because the estimated impact of military service on the
schooling of nonwhites is much smaller. The 1948-52 sample is more useful than the 1950-
52 sample in this context because the wider age range helps to pin down the experience
proﬁle. As a benchmark, column (1) reports OLS estimates treating all variables as
exogenous. With potential experience deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( 3 ) ,t h er e t u r n st os c h o o l i n g
are about .12. The estimated experience proﬁle in this case does not have the usual
concavity, reﬂe c t i n gt h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r o ﬁle in this age range is essentially ﬂat (the
experience derivative is small, about .009 (s.e.=.0006)). The implicit veteran eﬀect on
earnings, constructed from (5a) and (5b), gives the predicted earnings loss due to veterans’
27This corresponds to the pure loss of experience model. 2SLS estimates of schooling coeﬃcients in a
model allowing the linear experience term to vary with veteran status are similar but less precise.
22lost experience. This is equal to -.016 (s.e.=.0011).28
Instrumental variables estimates of the return to schooling are considerably smaller
than the corresponding OLS estimates. This can be seen in columns 2-8 of Table 6,
w h i c hr e p o r t2 S L Sa n dL I M Le s t i m a t e so f( 2 ) .I no v e r - i d e n t i ﬁed models, LIML provides
ac h e c ko nﬁnite-sample bias in 2SLS.29 As shown in column 2, estimates from a just-
identiﬁed model using agei, age2
i and draft-eligibility (eligi) as instruments for the three
endogenous variables xi, x2
i and si generate a return of .07 (s.e.= .035). Swapping year-of-
birth dummies for agei and age2
i generates a 2SLS estimate of .078 (s.e.=.034), reported
in column 3.
The F-statistic for all excluded instruments in column 3 is large (93.3), but this is
misleading since age and year of birth serve as instruments for potential experience more
than for schooling. The F-statistic for RSN-instruments only (in this case, a single draft-
eligibility dummy) is 39.4 in column 3, roughly the square of the t-statistic for the just-
identiﬁed schooling model in Table 4a. Most relevant is an F-statistic that explicitly
takes account of multiple endogenous variables in the 2SLS procedure. This statistic,
which adjusts for the fact that all the instruments predict all the endogenous variables,
is smaller still (a value of 15 in column 3), but still outside the range where bias in
2SLS estimates is usually a concern.30 The LIML estimates in column 4 are close to the
corresponding 2SLS estimates, as expected since the degree of over-identiﬁcation for the
28Estimates using linear potential-experience controls (i.e., dropping the quadratic term), not reported
to save space, are almost identical to those reported in Table 6 (linear experience coeﬃcients are close to
the average experience derivatives in the quadratic model).
29The ﬁnite-sample behavior of LIML is discussed in, e.g., Anderson, Kunitomo, and Sawa (1982).
30The multivariate ﬁrst-stage F is constructed as follows. Assume covariates have been partialled out
of the instrument list and that there are two endogenous variables, W1 and W2 with coeﬃcients δ1 and
δ2. We are interested in the bias of the 2SLS estimator of δ2 when W1 is also treated as endogenous.
In matrix notation, the instrument vector is Z, with projection matrix Pz = Z(Z0Z)−1Z0. The second
stage equation is
y = PzW1δ1 + PzW2δ2 +[   +( W1 − PzW1)δ1 +( W2 − PzW2)δ2],
where   is the vector of structural errors. The 2SLS estimator of δ2 c a nb es e e nt ob et h eO L Sr e g r e s s i o n
on Pz[M1zW2],w h e r eM1z =[ I − PzW1(W0
1PzW1)−1W0
1Pz]. This is also 2SLS using Pz to instrument
M1zW2. In other words, the endogenous variable of interest is M1zW2, itself the residual from a 2SLS




The explained sum of squares (numerator of the F-stat i s t i c )t h a td e t e r m i n e sb i a si st h e r e f o r et h ee x p e c -
tation of [W0
2M1zPzM1zW2], as can be shown formally using the group-asymptotic sequence in Bekker
(1994) and Angrist and Krueger (1995).
23m o d e lr e p o r t e di nc o l u m n3i st w o .
In an attempt to increase the precision of the estimated schooling coeﬃcients, we
used the 5zx and 7zx instrument sets constructed from 5 and 7 RSN dummies interacted
with year of birth. The resulting 2SLS estimates of the returns to schooling, reported
in columns 5 and 7 of Table 6, are indeed more precise than the estimates in columns
2 and 3, though they are also smaller. For example, the estimated returns to schooling
using the 5zx and 7zx instrument sets are .043 (s.e.=.03) and .051 (s.e.=.028). The
multivariate ﬁrst-stage F-statistics for both of these models are low, about 3.6 in column
5 and 2.9 in column 7. This is a consequence of that fact that many of the interaction
terms included in the expanded instrument lists have little predictive power. Also of
concern in the heavily over-identiﬁed speciﬁcations is the fact that the LIML estimates
fall to zero with standard errors almost twice as large as those for the corresponding 2SLS
estimates. Interestingly, the precision of the LIML estimates decreases with the degree of
over-identiﬁcation. Overall, therefore, the low degree-of-overidentiﬁcation estimates in
columns 2 and 3 appear more reliable.31
Finally, we estimate a model that allows disability rates to increase with Vietnam-era
service:
yi = β0γ + β1γxi + β2γx
2
i + ργsi + γdi + ui, (10)
where di indicates non-work disability status (the disability variable that is most aﬀected
by veteran status in Panel A of Table 5), with coeﬃcient γ. The addition of di to the list
of endogenous variables generates highly imprecise results, but we can get a sense of the
consequences of higher disability rates for 2SLS estimates of equation (10) by inserting
plausible values of γ = γ∗ in the following model
y
∗
i ≡ yi − γ
∗di = β0γ + β1γxi + β2γx
2
i + ργsi +  i. (11)
As a benchmark, we set γ∗ = −.2, slightly larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate of
the wage loss associated with non-work disabilities using equation (10).
Adjusting for disability status in this manner increases the 2SLS estimates of the
returns to schooling by .005-.007, as Panel B of Table 6 shows. Variations on these results
31The standard errors reported for both the LIML and 2SLS estimates in Table 6 are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. LIML is motivated by a homoscedastic normal model but can be understood as a k-class esti-
mator in either case. The collapse of LIML in columns 5 and 7 may be explained by the group-asymptotic
inconsistency of LIML under some forms of heteroscedasticity. Hausman, Newey, and Woutersen (2006)
report a heteroscedastic simulation in a many-weak IV scenario where the bias of LIML is away from
OLS.
24for alternative choices of γ∗ can be obtained by observing that b ργ, the 2SLS estimate of the
schooling coeﬃcient in equation (11), is related to b ρ, the 2SLS estimate of the schooling
coeﬃcient imposing γ∗ =0 , as follows:
b ργ = b ρ − b λγ
∗,
where b λ is the 2SLS estimate of the coeﬃcient on si in a regression of di on the variables
on the right-hand side of (11), again, treating all variables as endogenous. Because b λ
in this adjustment is only about .03, the diﬀerence between b ργ and b ρ is small for any
plausible value of γ∗.
A low economic return to GI-Bill-subsidized schooling is not a universal ﬁnding. Using
the Canadian WWII-era GI Bill as a source of exogenous variation, Lemieux and Card
(2001) report IV estimates larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. But attenuated
returns to post-service schooling are broadly in line with a number of earlier investigations
of the returns to schooling for Vietnam veterans. For example, Schwartz (1986) estimated
the returns to schooling to be .025 lower for Vietnam veterans than for comparably-aged
non-veterans, while Angrist (1993) reported a return to Vietnam veterans’ post-service
s c h o o l i n go f. 0 4 3u s i n gt h e1 9 8 7s u r v e yo fv eterans. Moreover, as noted by Berger and
Hirsch (1983), low returns to GI-Bill schooling can be explained by the large subsidies
provided through the Bill.32
7 Summary and Conclusions
Consistent with a ﬂattening of age-earnings proﬁles in middle age, the adverse economic
consequences of Vietnam-era military service appear to have faded. At the same time,
2000 census data show a strong positive connection between schooling and military service.
This schooling gain is very likely due to the Vietnam-era GI Bill. Overall, the schooling
eﬀects estimated here are similar to those reported in earlier studies of the WWII and
Korean-era GI bills.
Seen through the lens of a Mincer-style wage equation, the near-zero veteran wage
penalty can be explained by the combination ofl o s te x p e r i e n c ea n dt h ee c o n o m i cr e t u r n
to additional schooling. The net eﬀect of GI-Bill funded schooling on earnings in the
32Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2005) estimate the impact of tuition and taxes on the internal rate of
return to schooling under alternative assumptions. They ﬁnd that tuition reduces the internal rate of
return to college completion for whites in the 1990 Census by about one quarter.
251948-52 sample is on the order of 2.3 percent in the 2000 data — the result of a .294
increase in highest grade completed times a .078 return (estimated using a single draft-
eligibility instrument). The loss in earnings to veterans due to lost experience amounts to
about 1.3 percent. Veterans may also have suﬀered a small earnings loss due to increased
disability rates, though there are no corresponding eﬀects on employment or work-related
disabilities.
Finally, it is noteworthy that 2SLS estimates of the returns to post-service schooling
are considerably smaller than the corresponding OLS estimates. This is unusual in the
literature using instrumental variables to estimate the returns to schooling, but it is
consistent with optimal schooling choices based on a comparison of marginal costs and
marginal beneﬁts. The low economic returns to GI-Bill funded schooling may reﬂect the
unusually large subsidies for schooling available to veterans.
26All Vietnam veteran Non-veteran All Vietnam veteran Non-veteran
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .376 .532 .327 .382 .482 .350
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .236 1 0 .244 1 0
Post-Vietnam service .038 .064 .030 .068 .078 .065
Now in military .0027 .0065 .0015 .0029 .0067 .0016
Now in school .028 .031 .027 .046 .053 .043
Age 48.2 48.4 48.2 48.2 48.3 48.2
Employment .861 .844 .866 .665 .702 .654
Unemployment .027 .030 .026 .056 .053 .057
Not in labor force .112 .126 .108 .279 .245 .290
Usual hours worked 41.5 40.7 41.7 32.8 34.3 32.3
Weeks worked  44.8 44.1 45.0 35.9 37.5 35.4
Wage and salary income 46406 39472 48553 27584 28505 27287
Log weekly earnings (positive values) 6.75 6.65 6.78 6.41 6.43 6.41
Self employment income (positive values) 5261 3123 5923 1709 1230 1863
Work disability  .123 .136 .118 .210 .207 .211
Non-work disability  .070 .084 .066 .116 .120 .114
Mobility disability .082 .103 .075 .132 .145 .128
Self-care disability .021 .023 .021 .040 .036 .041
Physical  disability .051 .055 .050 .121 .111 .124
Mental  disability .044 .049 .042 .073 .072 .073
Vision or hearing  disability .036 .042 .034 .045 .045 .045
Other income (includes VDC) 392 754 279 566 1085 398
Other income >0 .054 .107 .037 .072 .134 .052
Retirement and disability pensions (includes MDP) 691 1445 458 848 1622 598
Retirement/Dis. income >0 .043 .091 .028 .065 .118 .047
Imputed highest grade completed 13.8 13.3 13.9 12.6 13.0 12.4
Years of college (0-4) 1.73 1.34 1.85 1.02 1.10 .988
9th grade + .977 .988 .974 .948 .981 .938
10th grade + .965 .978 .961 .923 .970 .908
11th grade + .948 .962 .943 .882 .950 .860
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .949 .926 .832 .923 .802
High school graduate + .910 .927 .904 .770 .881 .735
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 .616 .667 .468 .585 .431
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 .519 .601 .400 .486 .372
Associate's degree + .411 .313 .441 .226 .243 .221
Bachelor's degree + .333 .204 .373 .160 .136 .168
Master's degree + .135 .071 .155 .057 .042 .062
Professional degree + .051 .017 .061 .018 .0094 .021
N 696530 166652 529878 96217 23246 72971
B. Disability and disability income variables
C. Education variables
Note: Sampling weights are used in all estimates and statistics.
Table 1. Basic descriptive statistics, by race and veteran status, for men born 1950-52
Whites Nonwhites
A. Labor market variables 1950-52 1948-52 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Draft-eligibility effect .145 .112 .058 .074 .133 .138 .168 .031
(.0013) (.0010) (.0010) (.0025) (.0024) (.0023) (.0022) (.0024)
RSN effects (5z):
RSN 1-95 .160 .128 .065 .088 .154 .155 .173 .032
(.0015) (.0013) (.0031) (.0031) (.0029) (.0026) (.0026) (.0022)
RSN 96-125 .091 .082 .060 .077 .131 .128 .023 .0002
(.0023) (.0019) (.0047) (.0046) (.0044) (.0040) (.0034) (.0031)
RSN 126-160 .059 .058 .054 .061 .126 .050 .0084 .00002
(.0020) (.0017) (.0045) (.0043) (.0041) (.0036) (.0031) (.0029)
RSN 161-195 .040 .044 .044 .054 .102 .024 -.0013 .0017
(.0020) (.0017) (.0044) (.0043) (.0041) (.0034) (.0030) (.0029)
RSN 196-230 .0065 .0059 .0043 .0062 .013 -.0012 .0077 .0008
(.0019) (.0017) (.0043) (.0042) (.0038) (.0032) (.0031) (.0029)
F-statistics 2403 2294 111 202 731 861 1028 50.3
Draft-eligibility effect .094 .072 .031 .049 .090 .096 .096 .027
(.0034) (.0028) (.0069) (.0065) (.0059) (.0060) (.0063) (.0058)
RSN effects (5z):
RSN 1-95 .100 .081 .039 .059 .101 .101 .099 .029
(.0041) (.0034) (.0086) (.0081) (.0074) (.0072) (.0070) (.0064)
RSN 96-125 .062 .058 .027 .072 .089 .090 .016 .0043
(.0061) (.0050) (.013) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.0095) (.0093)
RSN 126-160 .044 .041 .027 .042 .093 .034 .0052 .0018
(.0057) (.0047) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.0092) (.0086)
RSN 161-195 .022 .021 .012 .027 .066 -.0047 .0055 .0023
(.0055) (.0046) (.012) (.011) (.010) .0092 (.0092) (.0087)
RSN 196-230 -.0031 .0007 -.004 .018 .008 -.010 -.0055 .0021
(.0054) (.0046) (.012) (.011) (.010) .0093 (.0088) (.0090)
F-statistics 138 134 4.98 14.3 48.9 55.1 47.3 4.51
B. Nonwhites
Note: Draft-eligibility effects and RSN group effects are from separate regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All models 
include a full set of dummies for years of birth, states of birth, and month of birth. Sampling weights are used in all estimates and 
statistics. 
Table 2. First-stage, by race and year of birth
Pooled cohorts By single year of birth
A. WhitesMean OLS elig 5zx Mean OLS elig 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Work variables in 1999
Employment .861 -.020 -.0043 -.0026 .855 -.010 -.0047 -.0033
(.0012) (.0072) (.0070) (.0009) (.0072) (.0066)
Unemployment .027 .0043 .0028 .0017 .027 .0028 .0022 .0014
(.0005) (.0033) (.0032) (.0004) (.0033) (.0030)
Not in labor force .112 .016 .0014 .0009 .118 .0074 .0025 .0019
(.0011) (.0066) (.0064) (.0008) (.0066) (.0060)
Usual hours worked 41.5 -.888 -.101 -.230 41.2 -.544 .055 -.137
(.054) (.334) (.325) (.040) (.335) (.305)
Weeks worked  44.8 -.752 -.133 -.192 44.5 -.243 -.120 -.175
(.054) (.330) (.321) (.040) (.331) (.301)
Earnings variables in 1999
Wage and salary income 46406 -8616 -517 -873 46595 -7936 -115 -548
(161) (1240) (1209) (128) (1243) (1133)
Log weekly wage 6.75 -.121 -.0038 -.0094 6.75 -.110 .009 -.0030
(.0026) (.016) (.016) (.0019) (.016) (.015)
Self employment income 5261 -2772 855 867 5285 -2846 487 668
(77.8) (616) (606) (62.3) (616) (567)
Work variables in 1999
Employment .665 .049 .018 .033 .662 .063 .0013 .020
(.0040) (.040) (.039) (.0030) (.040) (.037)
Unemployment .056 -.0035 -.047 -.048 .054 -.0063 -.027 -.036
(.0019) (.019) (.019) (.0014) (.019) (.018)
Not in labor force .279 -.045 .029 .015 .284 -.057 .026 .016
(.0039) (.039) (.038) (.0029) (.039) (.035)
Usual hours worked 32.8 1.97 3.58 4.12 32.6 2.33 3.68 3.76
(.171) (1.71) (1.68) (.129) (1.73) (1.57)
Weeks worked  35.9 2.14 2.84 3.15 35.7 2.73 2.41 2.71
(.186) (1.86) (1.82) (.141) (1.88) (1.70)
Earnings variables in 1999
Wage and salary income 27584 1324 3476 4969 27711 2109 1006 3314
(313) (3231) (3199) (239) (3255) (2968)
Log weekly wage 6.41 .028 -.037 .012 6.43 .042 -.0090 .019
(.0074) (.067) (.065) (.0057) (.067) (.060)
Self employment income 1709 -616 328 436 1708 -511 1750 1115
(108) (1177) (1147) (82.4) (1167) (1077)
A. Whites
B. Nonwhites
Note:  All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth,  year of birth and month of birth. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 report 
2SLS estimates with the instrument sets listed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates computed using 
sampling weights.
Table 3. Effects on labor market variables
1950-52 1948-52
2SLS 2SLSMean OLS elig 5zx Mean OLS elig 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling (imputed) 13.8 -.551 .332 .336 13.8 -.550 .294 .314
(.0074) (.053) (.052) (.0057) (.053) (.049)
Years of college  1.73 -.512 .265 .261 1.76 -.534 .238 .248
(.0050) (.035) (.034) (.0038) (.034) (.032)
9th grade + .977 .015 .0056 .0061 .975 .020 .0021 .0040
(.0004) (.0031) (.0030) (.0003) (.0031) (.0028)
10th grade + .965 .018 .0080 .0083 .963 .025 .0042 .0062
(.0005) (.0037) (.0036) (.0004) (.0038) (.0034)
11th grade + .948 .021 .012 .013 .946 .029 .0071 .010
(.0007) (.0045) (.0044) (.0005) (.0045) (.0041)
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .024 .015 .016 .930 .033 .009 .013
(.0008) (.0051) (.0049) (.0006) (.0050) (.0046)
High school graduate or higher + .910 .025 .023 .023 .908 .034 .017 .020
(.0009) (.0057) (.0056) (.0006) (.0057) (.0052)
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 -.050 .079 .079 .659 -.048 .064 .070
(.0015) (.009) (.0093) (.0011) (.0094) (.0086)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 -.082 .090 .089 .588 -.083 .074 .080
(.0016) (.010) (.010) (.0012) (.010) (.0090)
Associate's degree + .411 -.126 .081 .079 .419 -.133 .074 .076
(.0015) (.010) (.010) (.0011) (.010) (.0091)
Bachelor's degree + .333 -.168 .053 .051 .341 -.176 .051 .051
(.0014) (.010) (.0094) (.0010) (.010) (.0088)
Master's degree + .135 -.082 .016 .017 .140 -.090 .019 .018
(.0009) (.0070) (.0068) (.0007) (.0070) (.0064)
Professional degree+ .051 -.043 .0047 .0037 .052 -.046 .010 .0057
(.0005) (.0045) (.0044) (.0004) (.0045) (.0041)
(Continued)
A. Whites
Table 4a: Effects on education, by race and by year of birth
1950-52 1948-52
2SLS 2SLSMean OLS elig 5zx Mean OLS elig 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10)
Years of schooling (imputed) 12.6 .512 .203 .190 12.6 .643 .184 .196
(.020) (.230) (.226) (.016) (.235) (.211)
Years of college 1.02 .118 .192 .173 1.02 .150 .159 .162
(.0116) (.118) (.115) (.0088) (.119) (.108)
9th grade + .948 .043 .0013 .0003 .944 .055 -.009 -.0018
(.0016) (.019) (.019) (.0013) (.020) (.018)
10th grade + .923 .063 -.0056 -.0044 .918 .079 -.015 -.0050
(.0019) (.023) (.022) (.0015) (.023) (.021)
11th grade + .882 .090 .019 .019 .876 .110 .016 .025
(.0023) (.027) (.027) (.0018) (.028) (.025)
12th grade (no diploma) + .832 .122 -.0021 -.0027 .826 .144 -.014 .0039
(.0027) (.032) (.031) (.0021) (.032) (.029)
High school graduate or higher + .770 .147 .055 .055 .766 .170 .045 .058
(.0032) (.035) (.034) (.0024) (.035) (.032)
Some college (less than 1 year) + .468 .158 .080 .083 .468 .171 .094 .092
(.0042) (.041) (.040) (.0031) (.041) (.037)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .400 .117 .070 .068 .400 .132 .054 .065
(.0042) (.040) (.040) (.0032) (.041) (.037)
Associate's degree + .226 .024 .055 .051 .228 .031 .042 .051
(.0036) (.035) (.034) (.0027) (.035) (.032)
Bachelor's degree + .160 -.032 .028 .019 .163 -.026 .012 .010
(.0030) (.031) (.030) (.0023) (.031) (.028)
Master's degree + .057 -.020 .0080 .0067 .060 -.021 .020 .011
(.0018) (.019) (.019) (.0014) (.020) (.018)
Professional degree+ .018 -.012 -.0028 -.0026 .019 -.012 .0086 .0018
(.0010) (.011) (.011) (.0008) (.011) (.010)
2SLS 2SLS
B. Nonwhites
Note:  All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth,  year of birth and month of birth. Columns 3-5 and 8-10 report 2SLS 
estimates with the instrument sets listed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates computed using sampling weights.
Table 4a: Estimates of effects of military services in Vietnam era on education, by race and by year of birth, continued
1950-52 1948-521948 1949 1950 1951 1952
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of schooling (imputed) .179 .132 .233 .455 .314
(.231) (.173) (.098) (.093) (.085)
Years of college .050 .200 .219 .354 .215
(.147) (.111) (.063) (.061) (.054)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .005 .019 .088 .105 .068
(.041) (.031) (.018) (.017) (.016)
Associate's degree + .004 .080 .072 .102 .067
(.042) (.032) (.018) (.018) (.016)
Bachelor's degree + .015 .061 .038 .075 .044
(.041) (.031) (.018) (.017) (.015)
Master's degree + .030 .021 -.004 .029 .024
(.031) (.023) (.013) (.012) (.011)
Years of schooling (imputed) 1.129 -.238 .006 .338 .028
(1.139) (.708) (.397) (.383) (.416)
Years of college .109 -.023 .065 .072 .257
(.584) (.352) (.203) (.198) (.207)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .015 .040 .003 .052 .122
(.198) (.119) (.069) (.068) (.072)
Associate's degree + .018 .031 -.004 .050 .066
(.172) (.104) (.060) (.058) (.061)
Bachelor's degree + -.073 -.087 .021 -.0220 .0330
(.152) (.091) (.052) (.051) (.054)
Master's degree + .112 .022 .023 -.029 .027
(.107) (.060) (.034) (.032) (.032)
Table 4b: 2SLS Estimates of effects on schooling, by race and single year of birth
A. Whites
B. Nonwhites
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of schooling effects by single year of birth using the 5z instrument set.
All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth, year of birth, and month of birth. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Estimates were computed using sampling weights.Mean OLS elig 5zx Mean OLS elig 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Disability variables
Work disability .124 .013 -.0005 -.0007 .212 -.010 -.045 -.054
(.0008) (.0066) (.0061) (.0026) (.034) (.031)
Non-work disability .074 .011 .013 .014 .120 -.0013 -.016 -.0062
(.0006) (.0053) (.0048) (.0021) (.028) (.026)
Mobility .086 .018 .0085 .012 .139 .0055 -.028 -.030
(.0007) (.0057) (.0051) (.0023) (.029) (.026)
Self care .022 .00002 .0074 .0077 .042 -.0085 .011 -.0011
(.0004) (.0030) (.0028) (.0013) (.017) (.016)
Physical .052 .0013 .0050 .0046 .122 -.014 -.0080 -.0080
(.0005) (.0045) (.0042) (.0021) (.028) (.025)
Mental .045 .0033 .0069 .0055 .076 -.0066 .015 .011
(.0005) (.0043) (.0039) (.0017) (.023) (.021)
Vision or hearing .038 .0050 .011 .012 .048 -.0032 .039 .036
(.0005) (.0039) (.0035) (.0014) (.018) (.016)
B. Disability-income variables
Other income (incl. VDC) 440 499 302 266 628 743 764 540
(9.14) (69.2) (62.6) (29.3) (320) (273)
Other income >0 .059 .072 .042 .040 .078 .087 .034 .040
(.0007) (.0047) (.0042) (.0020) (.022) (.020)
Retirement/Dis. income (incl. MDP) 855 947 563 475 973 956 1015 847
(18.1) (129) (109) (51.6) (590) (458)
Retirement/Dis. income >0 .051 .057 .030 .031 .071 .067 .063 .052
(.0006) (.0044) (.0039) (.0019) (.021) (.019)
Note: All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth, year of birth and month of birth. Columns 3-4 and 7-8
report 2SLS estimates with the instrument sets listed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates computed
using sampling weights.
Table 5: Effects on disability status and disability-income variables, for men born 1948-52
Whites Nonwhites
2SLS 2SLSElig+age
2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
- 155 93.3 - 16.8 - 12.7 -
- 38.8 39.4 - 2.45 - 1.95 -
- 24.5 15.0 - 3.61 - 2.89 -
Second Stage Estimates                                         
Years of schooling (imputed) .118 .070 .078 .075 .043 .0066 .051 .0025
(.0007) (.035) (.034) (.037) (.030) (.047) (.028) (.054)
Veteran-adjusted potential experience -.057 -.0036 -.015 -.015 .011 .010 .017 .015
 =age-educ-6-2*vet (.0048) (.031) (.040) (.040) (.038) (.040) (.038) (.040)
Potential experience squared .0011 .0002 .0004 .0004 -.0001 .000001 -.0002 -.0001
(.0001) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
Experience derivative .0090 .0069 .0066 .0067 .0082 .010 .0078 .010
(.0006) (.0019) (.0018) (.0020) (.0017) (.0025) (.0016) (.0028)
Implicit veteran effect -.016 -.013 -.013 -.013 -.017 -.020 -.016 -.021
(.0011) (.0038) (.0038) (.0040) (.0033) (.0048) (.0032) (.0054)
Years of schooling (imputed) .116 .077 .084 .082 .048 .014 .056 .012
(.0007) (.035) (.034) (.037) (.030) (.047) (.028) (.053)
Reduced-form veteran effect -.017 -.014 -.013 -.013 -.017 -.020 -.016 -.021
(.0011) (.0037) (.0037) (.0040) (.0033) (.0048) (.0032) (.0054)
Notes: The table reports estimates of the structural wage equation described in the text. The average experience in the sample is 28.85 and 
average schooling is 13.8.
 A.  Without non-work disability controls














































































Figure 1. First-stage plots (bandwidth = 4) . The relation between probability 
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Figure 3. 2SLS Estimates of the Effects of Vietnam-era Military Service
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Figure 7. Non-SSA Disability Income (Including MDP) by Year and
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Figure 8. CPS Disability and Health Status by Year and Service Era - WhitesAppendix
A. Figures 4 and 5
Figures 4 and 5 use data from the 1964, 1965, and 1967-1991 CPS March Demographic
Supplements (the 1966 supplement does not contain veteran status). All data were down-
loaded from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
accessible at www.ipums.org. We include Vietnam veterans and non-veterans born 1948-
1952 in both ﬁgures, as well as Korea veterans and non-veterans born 1929-1933 in Figure
4. Year of birth was imputed assuming men were born after the survey date. We catego-
rized Vietnam veterans as all men born between 1948-1952 who were either veterans, as
reported by the variable VETSTAT, or currently serving in the military, as reported by
the variable EMPSTAT. Use of VETSTAT instead of period-of-service recodes adds a few
veterans with post-Vietnam service, including some still in the military. Korea veterans
were identiﬁed in an identical manner, except we used the 1929-1933 birth cohort.
Figure 4 reports mean years of education, derived from the variable HIGRADE, for
veterans and non-veterans. Unlike CPS supplements from 1992 or later, the earlier sup-
plements in our sample report years of education instead of highest degree obtained. The
data are weighted using the person level weight PERWT, and collapsed over age rather
than year, so at any given age, the average is derived from multiple years of data. We
selected the sample so that at least three birth cohorts (i.e., 3 years of data) contribute to
any given age-education observation. Figure 5 collapses the education data by age in the
same way described above. We then constructed two and three year moving averages of
mean years of education. The moving averages are unweighted in that each age-education
observation enters with equal weight in the moving average. Panel A reports the diﬀer-
ence between the value of the moving average for veterans and non-veterans. The X-axis
reports the ﬁrst year of the age interval included in each moving average observation. (For
example, the age 20 three-year moving average observation is the educational attainment
of those aged 20, 21 and 22.) The same data were used to construct panel B, except that
this panel shows the diﬀerence between the moving average at age 19 and subsequent
values.B. Figures 6, 7, and 8
Figures 6, 7, and 8 use data from the 1990-2006 CPS March Demographic Supplements,
also from IPUMS. We constructed birth year and selected birth cohorts in the same way
as described for Figures 4 and 5. Here, however, instead of assigning service era based
on birth year, we used the variable VETLAST, which reports an individual’s most recent
period of service. Active duty servicemen were excluded from this sample.
The disability-related income variables most relevant for veterans in the CPS are In-
come from Veteran Beneﬁts (INCVET) and Income from Disability Beneﬁts (INCDISAB).
INCVET captures any income from the VA., including service related disability payments
(VDC), non-disability pension payments, and educational allowances. INCDISAB infor-
mation is collected only for respondents who indicate the presence of a household mem-
ber with a disability. This variable includes U.S. military retirement disability pensions
(MDP) but excludes disability payments from the VA or Social Security. It also covers
worker’s compensation, company, union, federal government civil service, state, or local
government disability programs, U.S. Railroad Retirement disability, private accident or
disability insurance, black lung miner’s disability, and state temporary sickness payments.
Amounts are in 2005 dollars.
Men who reported a disability that limits or prevents work were identiﬁed from the
variable DISABWRK. This is the screening variable for INCDISAB. Men with fair or
poor health were identiﬁed using the variable HEALTH, which gives self-reported health
status. This variable is only available from 1996-2006.
All plots show weighted means collapsed by year using PERWT. Since income amounts
refer to the previous year in the March CPS, Figures 6 and 7 run from 1989-2005. Disabil-
ity and health measures refer to the time of the survey, so Panel A of Figure 8 runs from
1990-2006 and Panel B from 1996-2006. Finally, all ﬁgures discussed in this appendix
include both imputed and non-imputed values.1950-52 1948-52 1948-53 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .376 .437 .405 .530 .536 .538 .339 .260 .259
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .236 .305 .276 .446 .384 .300 .221 .193 .139
Post-Vietnam service .038 .034 .037 .027 .030 .033 .037 .044 .050
Group quarters .016 .015 .015 .014 .014 .015 .016 .016 .017
Now in military .0027 .0024 .0026 .0019 .0022 .0024 .0026 .0030 .0032
Now in school .028 .026 .027 .023 .024 .026 .028 .030 .031
Age 48.2 49.2 48.7 51.3 50.2 49.2 48.2 47.2 46.2
Employment .861 .855 .857 .843 .850 .855 .861 .865 .867
Unemployment .027 .027 .027 .026 .027 .027 .027 .027 .028
Not in labor force .112 .118 .116 .131 .124 .118 .112 .107 .105
Usual hours worked 41.5 41.2 41.3 40.5 40.9 41.2 41.5 41.7 41.8
Weeks worked  44.8 44.5 44.6 43.9 44.2 44.4 44.8 45.0 45.1
Wage and salary income 46406 46595 46521 46830 46957 46293 46592 46331 46176
Work disability .123 .124 .123 .128 .125 .125 .122 .121 .119
Other disabilities .143 .149 .146 .163 .153 .149 .142 .138 .133
Non-work disabilities .070 .074 .072 .082 .077 .074 .070 .068 .065
Any disabilities .193 .198 .196 .211 .202 .199 .192 .189 .184
Mobility .082 .086 .084 .097 .090 .087 .082 .077 .074
Self care .021 .022 .022 .024 .022 .022 .021 .020 .020
Physical .051 .052 .052 .055 .053 .053 .051 .050 .049
Mental .044 .045 .045 .048 .047 .046 .044 .042 .042
Vision or hearing .036 .038 .037 .043 .041 .038 .035 .034 .032
Other income (e.g.,VA, UI, child support, 
alimony;  incl. VDC) 392 440 420 546 486 444 377 357 328
Other income >0 .054 .059 .057 .070 .064 .058 .053 .050 .048
Retirement/Dis. income (Retirement, survivor, 
disability pensions; incl. MDP) 691 855 800 1223 1007 787 673 621 541
Retirement income >0 .043 .051 .048 .068 .059 .049 .043 .038 .036
Imputed highest grade completed 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.6 g
Years of college 1.73 1.76 1.74 1.82 1.80 1.77 1.73 1.70 1.63
9th grade + .977 .975 .976 .971 .974 .975 .978 .978 .979
10th grade + .965 .963 .963 .958 .961 .963 .966 .966 .966
11th grade + .948 .946 .946 .942 .943 .945 .948 .949 .948
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .930 .930 .927 .928 .930 .932 .932 .930
High school graduate + .910 .908 .908 .906 .907 .908 .910 .910 .907
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 .659 .654 .667 .667 .662 .657 .646 .629
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 .588 .582 .599 .598 .591 .584 .571 .551
Associate's degree + .411 .419 .413 .433 .428 .420 .411 .402 .387
Bachelor's degree + .333 .341 .335 .358 .350 .342 .333 .324 .309
Master's degree + .135 .140 .137 .151 .145 .139 .135 .131 .122
Professional degree + .051 .052 .051 .054 .053 .051 .051 .050 .047
N (log earnings) 573728 934666 1134983 178349 182315 183435 191559 198734 200267
N (all other variables) 696530 1141905 1382708 220891 224130 223984 232348 240198 240736
Note: Sampling weights are used in all estimates and statistics.
Table A1.  Descriptive statistics for white cohorts
A. Labor market variables 
B. Disability and disability income variables
C. Education variables1950-52 1948-52 1948-53 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .382 .440 .408 .538 .537 .544 .343 .265 .265
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .293 .293 .274 .404 .353 .285 .231 .216 .183
Post-Vietnam service .058 .058 .066 .039 .042 .050 .071 .083 .101
Group quarters .064 .064 .066 .056 .060 .064 .066 .071 .076
Now in military .0025 .0025 .0028 .0020 .0019 .0020 .0027 .0038 .0039
Now in school .043 .043 .044 .038 .039 .045 .044 .048 .050
Age 49.2 49.2 48.6 51.3 50.2 49.3 48.2 47.3 46.2
Employment .665 .662 .663 .657 .654 .662 .666 .669 .670
Unemployment .056 .054 .055 .047 .055 .053 .056 .057 .059
Not in labor force .279 .284 .282 .296 .291 .285 .279 .274 .270
Usual hours worked 32.8 32.6 32.7 32.1 32.3 32.6 32.8 33.1 33.0
Weeks worked  35.9 35.7 35.7 35.4 35.4 35.7 35.8 36.1 35.9
Wage and salary income 27584 27711 27561 28395 27490 27569 27508 27670 26874
Work disability .210 .212 .211 .214 .216 .213 .210 .207 .205
Any other disabilities .247 .254 .251 .267 .264 .252 .249 .241 .237
Non-work disabilities .116 .120 .118 .130 .125 .119 .115 .114 .110
Any disabilities .326 .332 .329 .343 .342 .331 .325 .321 .314
Mobility .132 .139 .135 .152 .147 .138 .135 .125 .118
Self care .040 .042 .041 .046 .044 .041 .041 .038 .038
Physical .121 .122 .122 .125 .124 .123 .122 .117 .119
Mental .073 .076 .075 .080 .079 .073 .075 .072 .074
Vision or hearing .045 .048 .047 .054 .052 .046 .046 .043 .044
Other income (e.g.,VA, UI, child support, 
alimony; incl. VDC) 566 628 609 763 708 627 559 513 520
Other income >0 .072 .078 .076 .091 .084 .075 .070 .070 .068
Retirement income (Retirement, survivor,  
disability pensions; incl. MDP) 848 973 929 1258 1117 916 867 765 731
Retirement income >0 .065 .071 .068 .085 .077 .068 .065 .062 .058
Imputed highest grade completed 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6
Years of college 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.03 1.02 .996 .994
9th grade + .948 .944 .946 .936 .936 .946 .948 .951 .953
10th grade + .923 .918 .920 .908 .908 .920 .923 .927 .930
11th grade + .882 .876 .878 .865 .866 .880 .882 .884 .887
12th grade (no diploma) + .832 .826 .828 .818 .817 .829 .831 .835 .833
High school graduate + .770 .766 .767 .759 .758 .768 .771 .772 .770
Some college (less than 1 year) + .468 .468 .467 .470 .464 .466 .472 .466 .461
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .400 .400 .399 .406 .398 .399 .404 .397 .392
Associate's degree + .226 .228 .227 .235 .229 .231 .226 .221 .221
Bachelor's degree + .160 .163 .162 .170 .164 .165 .162 .154 .156
Master's degree + .057 .060 .058 .068 .062 .061 .059 .051 .052
Professional degree + .018 .019 .019 .021 .019 .020 .019 .017 .017
N (log earnings) 71045 113194 137938 20286 21863 23383 23004 24658 24744
N (all other variables) 96217 154810 188023 28272 30321 31942 31162 33113 33213
Note: Sampling weights are used in all estimates and statistics.
Table A2.  Descriptive statistics for nonwhite cohorts
A. Labor market variables 
B. Disability and disability income variables
C. Education variablesAll White Nonwhite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1948 195/366 -0.0015 -0.0025 0.0048
[.533] (.0011) (.0012) (.0022)
1949 195/365 0.0018 0.0017 0.0028
[.534] (.0011) (.0012) (.0033)
1950 195/365 0.0049 0.0041 0.0097
[.534] (.0011) (.0012) (.0032)
1951 125/365 -0.0025 -0.0030 0.0002
[.342] (.0011) (.0011) (.0031)
1952 95/366 0.0008 0.00003 0.0055
[.260] (.0010) (.0010) (.0028)
1953 95/365 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0050
[.260] (.0010) (.0010) (.0028)
F(6,∞) 5.07 4.37 3.24
N 1570310 1382287 188023
Notes: The theoretical proportion draft eligible is reported in column
1 for each cohort. Fractions appear in brackets. Columns 2-4 report
the difference between this and the empirical proportion draft-
eligible, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-statistic is
for a joint test of theoretical and empirical equality for all  cohorts.
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